We consider the formation and legal protection of secret agreements by analyzing a negotiated settlement between an injured plaintiff and a culpable defendant that seeks to disenfranchise a second injured plaintiff by keeping the existence (and details) of the instant settlement secret. This is done so as to reduce the likelihood of the second plaintiff suing the defendant for damages or, failing that, to conceal information regarding culpability. Such agreements happen every day and are generally legal, but are they socially optimal? Formally, we consider a sequence of incomplete information bargaining games wherein uninformed plaintiffs make demands of the informed defendant, with the defendant and the early plaintiff recognizing that their actions in the first case may convey information about the defendant's culpability to the later plaintiff. We show that confidentiality decreases the likelihood of trial in the early case, increases the likelihood of trial (given suit) in the later case, decreases total expected trial costs, increases the early plaintiff's expected payoff from settlement, and decreases both the average plaintiff's payoff and the average defendant's costs. While one might expect that confidential settlements would be used only by the most culpable defendants, we find that the early plaintiff's equilibrium demand acts to pool a relatively large proportion of the defendant types, thereby obfuscating the defendant's culpability. We also discuss how the analysis provides insight as to when the law should prohibit or permit confidential settlements.
Introduction
In this paper we consider the formation and legal protection of a secret agreement between two parties that substantially affects the interests of a third party. While such agreements are privately valuable to some of the affected parties, and they happen every day, what are the positive and normative implications of protecting such secrets? Specifically, we consider a negotiated settlement between an injured plaintiff and a culpable defendant that seeks to disenfranchise a second injured plaintiff by keeping the existence (and details) of the instant settlement secret, so as to reduce the likelihood of the second plaintiff suing the defendant for damages or, failing that, to conceal information regarding culpability. We assume that the level of the defendant's culpability is the same in both cases (referred to as "strongly correlated culpability"), so the disposition of the first case (whether resolved by trial or settlement, and the observed particulars of either outcome) is, potentially, very informative for the second plaintiff. Formally, we consider a sequence of incomplete information bargaining games wherein uninformed plaintiffs make demands of the informed defendant, with the defendant and the early plaintiff recognizing that their actions in the first case may convey information to the later plaintiff.
We find that allowing confidentiality increases the likelihood of settlement in the early case, but increases the likelihood of trial (given suit) in the later case; on net, however, total expected trial costs are lower. While the early plaintiff's equilibrium payoff is increased by allowing confidentiality and the later plaintiff's is decreased, the average plaintiff's equilibrium payoff is decreased (despite the fact that our timing convention "stacks the deck" in favor of the plaintiffs, who make take-it-orleave-it settlement demands). This latter effect can have substantial consequences for goods markets.
For example, in a market setting, the average consumer anticipates lower compensation when confidential settlements are possible, potentially reducing demand for products that have unobservable safety attributes. The result that the average plaintiff's payoff is decreased by confidentiality depends on the degree to which the defendant's culpability in each of the cases is correlated: weaker correlation can lead to the average plaintiff's payoff increasing when confidentiality is allowed.
Expected settlement transfers (from the defendant to the early plaintiff) are also increased by confidentiality, but not sufficiently to discourage defendants from using such agreements: the average defendant's payoff also improves when confidentiality is allowed.
Settling a suit results in an adverse inference regarding culpability, since the more culpable defendant types settle while the less culpable go to trial. Nevertheless, settlement can be desirable for the defendant because it results in a saving of the associated trial costs. Settling confidentially also results in an adverse inference regarding culpability and the saving of trial costs; thus, in order for confidentiality to be valuable to the defendant, it must provide some other benefit beyond that provided by settlement alone. We argue that one such benefit is the reduction in later suits due to reduced publicity surrounding the early suit and its disposition.
Thus, in this paper we consider two related informational effects (which are described more formally below). The first, called the "publicity effect," refers to the fact that settlement is likely to result in less publicity than a full-blown trial, while confidential settlement is likely to result in even less publicity. Publicity is important because it can encourage later suits, as other plaintiffs are more likely to realize that they may have a case against this particular defendant. The second informational effect, called the "learning effect," is a consequence of correlated culpability. Later plaintiffs will find the outcome of a given case, and the details of the outcome (for example, the settlement amount), of interest in updating their beliefs regarding negotiation and trial in their own cases; that is, they will learn something about the defendant's culpability (albeit, possibly imperfectly). 1 The following is drawn from Singer (1998) and from Ashcraft v. Conoco, (Jan. 21, 1998) .
The extent of learning is, however, dependent upon the demand made by the early plaintiff.
One might expect that confidential settlements would be used for a (relatively) small set of types, concentrated at the "top" (i.e., most culpable) of the type space. If this were the case, then confidential settlement would signal a highly culpable defendant. In contrast, we find that the early plaintiff's equilibrium demand, under confidentiality, actually acts to obfuscate the defendant's culpability. By this we mean that the equilibrium demand pools a (relatively) large set of defendant types (in fact, larger than settlement alone). This may explain the claim (see below) that confidential settlement is becoming widely used, and thus one should not infer that those who use it are the most culpable defendants.
A good example of the use of a confidential settlement in a case of strongly correlated culpability is a recent "toxic tort" case brought by 178 residents of two trailer parks in Wrightsboro, North Carolina against Conoco, Inc. 1 The suit claimed that Conoco was liable for "negligence, fraud and willful misconduct for leaking gasoline into the community's drinking water from a nearby gas station." Partway through the trial Conoco settled with the plaintiffs and the Court sealed the settlement, issuing a protective order to enforce the confidentiality of the agreement. Not long after the sealing order was issued a court clerk accidently provided a copy of the sealed settlement to a reporter for a newspaper, which, along with separately-developed (unofficial) information, resulted in the publication of the main details of the settlement on the front page of the Wilmington, N.C.,
Morning Star. The reporter was held in criminal contempt, the reporter and the newspaper were held in civil contempt and a second reporter was later ordered to reveal the sources of the unofficial information. The civil contempt penalty was set at the level of Conoco's court costs in pursuing the 2 Indeed, cases can be filed under seal, so even the parties' identities are confidential. As one Texas Supreme Court justice notes (Doggett and Mucchetti, 1991, p. 645) , "Even the sealing orders are frequently sealed." contempt citation plus $500,000 as damages. The civil contempt damages were set to reflect the likely increased costs to Conoco of dealing with future suits; at that time, Conoco was defending itself against over fifty similar toxic tort claims around the country.
Repeated driving under the influence of alcohol, the persistent use of shoddy manufacturing materials and insufficient monitoring of a firm's employees with respect to sexual harassment are also (disparate) examples of correlated culpability. We are not considering events such as a single airplane crash (where the liability outcome must, of necessity, be the same for all plaintiffs); even though this involves multiple plaintiffs, it is essentially a single case (e.g., a class action). Rather, a series of events which could be traced to the same failure (such as a series of crashes by the same airline, or the same type of airplane), where that failure will reflect a consistent level of culpability of a specific defendant (an airframe manufacturer, or a specific airline's maintenance procedures), would be an instance of strongly correlated culpability (but not a class action; we discuss this in more detail below). In such cases, while culpability is correlated, the actual outcome of each case may vary due to case-specific attributes.
Background on Confidential Settlements
There are two methods of maintaining confidentiality of settlements. A court may issue a protective order, sealing the settlement agreement (and often all associated discovery materials), and issue a "gag" order to the parties; this was what the Court did above and why contempt sanctions were employed (in this case, against an individual and a firm who were not parties to the confidential agreement).
2 Alternatively, the parties to the dispute may agree to dismiss the suit and enter into a private "contract of silence" (see, e.g., Garfield, 1998) in which they agree not to discuss the terms of the settlement or to disseminate information obtained through discovery. We will refer to a settlement as "sealed" or "confidential," whether this is achieved by court order or by contract. Any settlement which is not made subject to a confidentiality agreement (or which a court refuses to seal) will be referred to as "unsealed" or "open."
Most suits settle without trial (over 90% in various estimates), but systematic data on the extent of confidential settlement is non-existent. In particular, voluntary dismissals accompanied by contracts of silence are simply recorded as voluntary dismissals; no indication of a settlement or its confidential nature will appear. In a series of articles in The Washington Post, Weiser and Walsh (1988a,b,c,d ) describe numerous individual examples of the existence of confidential settlements (including malpractice, falsification of pharmaceutical test results, safety hazards in public facilities, race and sex discrimination), as well as their (essentially fruitless) search for official data on courtissued sealing orders. "No local courthouse keeps a publicly available record of which lawsuits are sealed, and internal record-keeping is so haphazard that most of the courts could not provide reliable figures." (1988b) However, there seems to be a consensus that the use of confidentiality is increasing, largely as a consequence of mass tort and product liability suits (good examples of correlated culpability). Weiser and Walsh (1988a) conclude that "The broad use of confidentiality provisions has emerged ... as businesses have found themselves the target of an increasing number of complex lawsuits that allege a product defect or improper conduct." Nissen (1994, pp.932-3) remarks that "In modern products liability cases, many defense attorneys routinely seek protective orders to create a 'wall of silence.'... This has led to an explosion of sealed court records cases." 3 In the past decade, many states have considered (and several have passed) "sunshine" laws mandating a strong presumption of public access to pretrial records (see Miller, 1991, p. 429 , footnote 7); on the other hand, two committees of the Judicial Conference recently proposed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to allow judges to impose confidentiality whenever the parties agreed on its desirability (these proposals were not adopted at the 1995 annual meeting; see Nader and Wesley, 1996, p. 357) . 4 According to Luban (1995 Luban ( , p. 2560 , examples of "products whose defects are alleged to have been hidden by protective orders or sealed settlements are Dow Corning's silicone gel breast implants; pickup trucks made by Ford and General Motors; Upjohn's sleeping pill Halcion; Pfizer's Bjork-Shiley heart valves; and McNeil Pharmaceutical's painkiller, Zomax." But see also Miller (1991, pp. 481-2) for arguments that, in many of these cases, sealed settlements were not responsible for the occurrence of further harm.
5 "It is probable that judges' lenient attitudes towards sealing settlement agreements are a reflection of the strong public policy favoring settlements. ... Even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for and encourage an activist role for judges in facilitating settlement." (FitzGerald, p. 406) . The importance of this goal is also reflected in the policy of making details of failed settlement negotiations inadmissible at trial, independent of whether or not they would be Judges have broad discretion to issue orders sealing settlement agreements and related papers, especially when obtained through discovery (see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Yeazell, 1996) .
They are expected to consider both the private interests of the parties and any relevant compelling public interests. There is widespread disagreement regarding the desirability of sealing settlement agreements and related documents.
3 Advocates of openness emphasize public interest considerations:
other injured people will realize that they have a case, further risks to health and safety will be averted, 4 and discovery sharing (which allows other plaintiffs to reduce their costs of suit) will be facilitated. Advocates of allowing confidentiality emphasize private interest considerations: discovery sharing is likely to inspire nuisance suits, important privacy interests of the parties (such as protecting trade secrets or highly personal information) will be violated, and many settlements are made contingent upon maintaining confidentiality (promoting settlement is an important goal of the civil justice system 5 ). The model developed below will address several (but not all) of these issues. In informative, in the belief that confidentiality will promote settlement. For a game-theoretic analysis of this policy, see Daughety and Reinganum (1995) . 6 Recent work on multi-issue bargaining includes Ponsati-Obiols (1992) and Ponsati and Watson (1997) ; the former is strategic (à la Rubinstein) under incomplete information, wherein each issue can take on one of two exogenously specified values, while the latter is axiomatic and involves complete information. 7 Early incomplete information models of settlement bargaining are P'ng (1983), Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) . An extensive literature on settlement bargaining involving screening and/or signaling during single or multiple periods has developed; for recent reviews, see Hay and Spier (1998) and . particular, we will explicitly model the informational externality between plaintiffs and assess the impact of confidentiality on the likelihood of achieving settlement. The interesting issues of discovery sharing and of nuisance suits (separately and in combination) would both require a model involving incomplete information about damages as well as culpability. This is beyond the scope of the current paper, though a topic of future research.
Related Literature
We are aware of six previous papers addressing the issue of sequential suits. Briggs, et. al. (1996) consider a government antitrust suit, wherein the defendant has private information as to whether he is liable or not liable, that may be followed by a private suit for treble damages. In their paper, all settlements are open, while we consider both open and confidential settlements. Furthermore, their model involves the defendant sequentially signaling to both plaintiffs (with the first signal observed by both plaintiffs), while ours involves plaintiffs sequentially screening the defendant (with the first case's disposition acting as a signal to the plaintiff in the second case). 7 Che and Yi (1993) provide two models in which two plaintiffs sue a single defendant, in sequence. In the first model ("correlated decisions"), the later plaintiff's likelihood of winning depends on the outcome of the early plaintiff's case in a specific (exogenously determined) way. In the second model ("correlated damages"), the two plaintiffs' damages are positively (but not perfectly) correlated.
Settlement offers are made to each of the plaintiffs, in sequence, by the uninformed defendant, who uses his negotiation with the early plaintiff to learn (or to avoid learning) something about the later plaintiff's likely level of damages. Yang (1996) considers a similar model (though with only two damage levels) in which he incorporates the filing decision, so as to address the possibility of using settlement in the early suit to deter the filing of the later suit. Peterson (1991) shares some basic similarities with the model we analyze in Section 3. In particular, a defendant with private information about his type is screened sequentially by two uninformed plaintiffs. Peterson assumes that the trial outcome in the early case determines the outcome in the later case (as in a single airplane crash) and he does not consider a publicity effect. Thus, settling the early suit results in an adverse inference about the defendant's culpability, with no potential off-setting benefits of settlement. Peterson finds that the first suit is less likely to settle (and the early plaintiff receives a lower payoff) if there is a later plaintiff to follow. These results are reversed in our model, wherein an early suit is more likely to settle, and the early plaintiff is strictly better off, when a later suit is anticipated. Finally, in all of these papers, the later plaintiff observes the amount of any settlement concluded with the early plaintiff; thus none of them allow for settlements to be confidential.
Yang (1994) reconsiders his analysis, incorporating sealed settlements; however, all settlements are open or all are sealed as a matter of policy, rather than choice; his welfare results are reported in Yang (1996) . Finally, Daughety and Reinganum (1999) consider a model in which a defendant has two elements of private information: the defendant knows his own culpability (either low or high) in causing one plaintiff's harm and he knows whether or not a second potential plaintiff exists. That paper considers a very weak form of correlation: the same defendant is involved in both cases, but the defendant's type (level of culpability) in the later plaintiff's case is uncorrelated with that in the early plaintiff's case. This is a reasonable model of a sequence of cases in which there are significant case-specific attributes or other intervening factors. They found that, if confidential settlements are allowed, equilibrium often involves the early plaintiff making a menu of settlement offers, one involving an open settlement and the other involving a confidential settlement, in an attempt to screen defendant types. The defendant types who engage in confidential settlements pay a premium over the defendant type who simply settles with no assurance of confidentiality: the early plaintiff receives "hush money" in exchange for her silence.
Plan of the Paper
In Section 2 we provide the basic structure and assumptions of the model which we then analyze in Section 3. Section 4 uses the results of the analysis to examine positive and normative implications of permitting or prohibiting confidential settlement agreements. Section 5 provides a discussion of some possible extensions and Section 6 summarizes and concludes. Appendix A contains the derivation of the equilibrium while Appendix B contains auxiliary claims and proofs.
Model Setup
We assume that there are three relevant parties: the early plaintiff, denoted P 1 ; the defendant, denoted D; and the later plaintiff, denoted P 2 . Initially, the plaintiffs, who realize they have suffered an injury, may not attribute this injury to the defendant. Rather, they may attribute the injury to their own error, to other causes or to chance. For example, an individual suffering from stomach cancer may attribute it to poor dietary choices or bad genes, rather than drinking contaminated water.
Similarly, an individual who loses control of her car on a rainy night may attribute her accident to driving too fast for conditions, or to slick roads, rather than to a defect in the car. Suppose there is an exogenous "background" probability, denoted (, that such an individual realizes (receives a private signal) that the defendant was indeed (potentially) responsible. Let P 1 denote the first individual to get this signal; our analysis begins at this point in time, at which the extent of the defendant's culpability is still unknown to P 1 . The defendant is assumed to possess private information regarding the extent of his culpability in causing P 1 's injury, which we identify with the probability that the defendant will be found liable in the event that P 1 files suit. Let B denote the probability that the defendant will be found liable in P 1 's suit, where B 0 [B, B G]. We assume that B reflects the minimum evidentiary standard necessary to obtain standing to sue; thus, defendant types who are "truly innocent" are weeded out by this pretrial requirement. D's culpability, B, is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(C), with continuously differentiable density function f(C) > 0 on
Thus, in addition to the defendant's activity, there are also case-specific attributes which result in imperfect information on the part of both parties regarding the outcome of the suit. Let k P and k D represent the trial costs for P i , i =1,2, and D, respectively (with k / k P + k D ), and let * denote the damage award should D be found liable; all of these are assumed to be common knowledge. Further, we assume that B* -k P > 0, so that when P 1 learns of D's involvement, it is a dominant strategy for P 1 to file suit.
Assumption 1. B* -k P > 0.
The disposition of P 1 's suit is likely to affect the probability that P 2 makes the connection between her injury and the defendant's activity. Possible dispositions of P 1 's suit are T (a trial), O (an 8 One could allow for imperfectly correlated culpabilities (say, denoted as B 1 and B
2 ) related by a commonly known joint distribution satisfying the monotone likelihood ratio principle. This adds needless complication to the exposition and fairly predictable qualitative effects; we return to this in Section 5.
unsealed, or open, settlement) or C (a sealed or confidential settlement). For instance, a trial is likely to be associated with more widespread publicity than is an open settlement, with a confidential settlement providing the least publicity. Let ( m = Pr{P 2 becomes aware that D could be at fault, given the disposition of P 1 's suit is m}, m = T, O, C. We assume that 1 = ( T > ( O > ( C $ (. That is, any disposition of P 1 's suit (at least weakly) increases P 2 's probability of realizing D's involvement. The exogenously specified parameter ( m captures the "publicity effect" discussed earlier.
Beyond such a publicity effect, however, is the possibility of P 2 learning by observing the outcome of the early suit: what was the evidence presented at trial, or what were the observable particulars of any settlement that was reached? As indicated earlier, this learning effect may be important if the sequence of suits that D faces reflects a correlated culpability on D's part. We assume that the defendant's type is (for simplicity) perfectly correlated in the two cases.
8 Notice that, although the outcomes (i.e., liable or not liable) in the two suits are correlated because B is the same in both suits, the outcome in the early suit does not determine the outcome in the later suit, which again reflects case-specific attributes resulting in imperfect information. For example, in the Conoco suits, each suit is likely to have to show that Conoco was negligent and responsible in the particular case. This might be influenced by local gas station policies, physical details about the site and its relationship to water supplies, and other potential sources of the pollution (such as other gasoline stations). Under the maintained assumption that B* -k P > 0, it is a dominant strategy for P 2 to file suit once alerted to D's involvement. 9 For example, in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decertified a nationwide class action (on behalf of hemophiliacs who contracted AIDS from blood solids) partly because the Court objected to "a single trial before a single jury instructed in accordance with no actual law of any jurisdiction -a jury that will receive a kind of Esperanto instruction, merging the negligence standards of the 50 states and the District of Columbia." (p. 1300 of the majority opinion by Chief Judge Richard A. Posner).
We assume that the early and later plaintiffs' suits cannot be consolidated into a single (class action) suit. This can occur for a variety of reasons. First, the early and later plaintiffs' injuries may not occur in the same time period. Second, the identity of the later plaintiff may not be known or easily discovered by the early plaintiff. Third, the case-specific attributes or differences in liability laws in different states may be sufficient to distinguish the cases so that they cannot be certified as a class. Thus, the cases must be considered as they arise, in sequence.
Since the defendant's type is strongly correlated across the two cases, the later plaintiff will draw an inference about B from observing the disposition of P 1 's suit (that is, T, O or C). For simplicity, we assume that upon observing T, P 2 learns D's type perfectly. This occurs because the record of the trial is available for scrutiny, allowing P 2 and her attorney to accurately assess B (this holds independent of whether D won or lost at trial).
Generally, sealed cases do not progress as the Conoco case did; basically, the most that is observable (if one is aware of the case at all) is that a confidential settlement occurred. Upon observing C, P 2 must make an inference about D's type based only on the knowledge that a confidential settlement was concluded, and not on the amount of that settlement (since it is sealed).
Finally, we assume that observing O implies observing also the amount of the settlement (since it is not sealed); thus P 2 makes an inference about D's type based on the knowledge that an unsealed settlement was concluded, and on the amount of that settlement. 10 In Section 5 we briefly discuss the issues associated with extending this model to allow a menu of demands, one demand involving an open settlement and one involving a confidential settlement.
We assume the following game form: P 1 makes a single settlement demand, specifying the amount and whether the settlement is to be open or confidential. 10 Any settlement demand will sort defendant types into (at most) two groups, those who settle and those who go to trial. We refer to such a grouping of defendant types as a configuration. In Appendix B (Claim 1), we show that a configuration of the form {OT} or {CT}, wherein defendant types with relatively low values of B choose settlement, while those with relatively high values of B choose trial, cannot be an equilibrium configuration. Thus, the only possible equilibrium configurations are of the following form:
1) all defendant types make the same choice; these configurations are {T}, {O} and {C}.
2) defendant types with relatively low values of B choose T, while those with relatively high values of B choose z, z = O,C; these configurations are denoted {Tz}, z = O,C.
Since the configurations {T}, {O} and {C} are (degenerate) special cases of the configurations {TO} and {TC}, it suffices to analyze the case {Tz} in detail, where z = O,C. We characterize equilibrium behavior and payoffs separately in each of these two configurations. We then allow P 1 (as the first mover) to choose between them if confidential settlement is permissible; if confidential settlement is not permissible, then configuration {TO} is P 1 's only option.
Given the structure of the configuration {Tz}, P 2 's beliefs upon observing z can be described as follows: P 2 believes that B 0 [t z , B G] for some t z , and the posterior density function for B on this interval is given by f(B)/[1 -F(t z )]. That is, upon observing a settlement rather than a trial, P 2 infers that the defendant has a relatively high level of culpability. Note that t C is simply a number (since the settlement amount is unobservable to P 2 ), while t O is a function of P 1 's settlement offer. We will make this distinction clear when it is relevant, but will otherwise simply refer to t z ; this abuse of notation provides an economy by allowing us to treat the two cases {TO} and {TC} simultaneously. Learning can occur via the impact of information concerning the previous case on P 2 's beliefs and t z summarizes this learning effect.
The hazard rate h(B) / f(B)/[1 -F(B)] will play an important role in the analysis to follow.
We maintain the following assumption regarding h(B).
Assumption 2. h(B) is an increasing function of B with h(B) = f(B) < */k. 
Analysis
We analyze the problem in reverse order to ensure the selection of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus we first consider P 2 's choice of settlement demand after observing the disposition of P 1 's case. Since P 2 is the last plaintiff, a defendant of type B will accept a demand of s from P 2 if and only if s # B* + k D . Recall that, upon observing T, P 2 learns the defendant's true type. In this case, the optimal demand for P 2 , denoted s*(T), is given by s*(T) = B* + k D . Upon observing a settlement, P 2 still faces a potential screening problem in which the highest demand that will be acceptable to a defendant of type B is given by s(B) = B* + k D . Let B 2 denote the marginal 12 We employ an upper case S for demands made by P 1 to distinguish them from the demands made by P 2 , which were denoted using a lower case s. $ max{B 2 *,t z } and otherwise rejects. P 2 's payoff is given by w 2 (max{B 2 *,t z }; z) and the defendant's cost (in the later suit) is given by V 2 *(B; z) = min{s*(z),B* + k D }.
Next we consider P 1 's choice of a marginal defendant type in the first stage, who is just indifferent between settling and going to trial, given that the settlement regime is z (z = O or C). For any given type B, there is a highest settlement demand 12 on the part of P 1 , denoted S z (B), that would still be acceptable to B; moreover, this highest acceptable demand will depend upon P 2 's anticipated demand upon observing that the defendant settled with P 1 , which is summarized in the continuation value V 2 *(B; z). Thus, for each B, the highest demand on the part of P 1 that is acceptable will satisfy S z (B) + ( z V 2 *(B; z) = 2[B* + k D ], where the right-hand-side is what the defendant of type B expects to pay if he goes to trial against P 1 , and is subsequently fully extracted by P 2 . P 1 can then be modeled as choosing a marginal type, denoted B z , and employing the highest acceptable demand for that type.
All defendants who are less culpable go to trial, while those who are more culpable settle with P 1 . It is possible that P 1 might choose to settle with all types of D, which is a boundary outcome. This would mean that configuration {Tz} would be simply configuration {z}. We provide a sufficient condition for an interior solution and proceed under this further assumption (in the analysis in Appendix A this is referred to as Assumption 2', since it implies Assumption 2 above). Finally, since the amount of the settlement is unobservable to P 2 when settlements are confidential, the analysis of the confidential settlement regime is somewhat more complex; in particular, we cannot eliminate the possibility that there may be no pure strategy equilibrium for some parameters. In order to ensure that a pure strategy equilibrium exists, we impose one further parametric restriction.
Assumption 3 implies that confidentiality is sufficiently effective at reducing publicity that might make P 2 aware of D's involvement in her injury. Note that the right-hand-side can be reexpressed as 1 -
. Thus, if total court costs, k, are small compared with P 2 's screening demand, then this is not a particularly restrictive assumption on the possible values that ( C can assume.
In Appendix A we show that the equilibrium marginal type (B z *) is implicitly defined by the equation:
( 1) it is straightforward to show that B z * < B 2 *. Proposition 2 summarizes the behavior of the parties along the equilibrium path. (ii) in the second stage, P 2 demands s*(T) = B* + k D from a defendant whose type has been revealed at trial, and this demand is accepted. P 2 demands s*(z) = B 2 ** + k D from a defendant who settled with P 1 ; defendant types with B < B 2 * reject this offer and go to trial, while defendant types with B $ B 2 * accept this offer.
Thus, equilibrium involves two rounds of screening. In particular: 1) types in the interval [B, B z *) go to trial against P 1 , but if there is a second suit, they settle with P 2 ; 2) types in the interval [B z *, B 2 *) settle with P 1 , but if there is a second suit, they go to trial against P 2 ; 3) types in the interval [B 2 *, B G] settle with P 1 and (if there is a second suit) settle with P 2 , too. Alternatively put, an implication of the model is that, in equilibrium, later plaintiffs sometimes go to trial, and they go to trial against defendant types who are neither the most nor the least culpable, but against those types that are "moderately" culpable. Finally, observe that P 2 's demand (as well as D's cost) in the later suit is the same following a settlement (independent of the nature of the settlement) as it would be in the absence of an early plaintiff. Thus, in equilibrium, learning affects P 2 's beliefs and her payoff, but not her equilibrium demand or D's costs in the second suit.
It is important to note that this last result is an outcome of equilibrium play, rather than being the early plaintiff. In this case, the later plaintiff learns something about the defendant that alters her subsequent demand. However, it is not in the early plaintiff's interest to provide this information to the later plaintiff, since it involves going to trial more often and foregoing the payment that many defendant types are willing to make in exchange for reduced publicity in the early suit.
The observation that B C * is less than B 2 * may seem to be at odds with a fairly common intuition that only very culpable Ds would be willing to pay for confidentiality. This does not occur in equilibrium; P 1 settles with more (moderately culpable) types, which is a benefit to them (via the publicity effect) and to the highly culpable Ds, who are now lumped together with the more moderately culpable Ds, lowering P 2 's demand to B 2 ** + k D . Thus, what P 1 provides highly culpable Ds (besides suppressing publicity) is obfuscation of their degree of culpability. In fact, as will be shown in the next section, B C * < B O * < B 2 *, so that an even larger set of types settle confidentially than settle openly. Thus, observing that P 1 and D have concluded a confidential settlement provides less information than observing the details of an open settlement: the exercise of confidentiality is not a useful signal that D is highly culpable.
Positive and Normative Implications of Allowing Sealed Settlements Positive Implications
We first compare the equilibria under configurations {TC} and {TO} in terms of 1) the likelihood of settlement given suit (both in the early case and in the later case); 2) total expected trial costs; 3) P 1 's equilibrium settlement demand, and P 1 's expected equilibrium settlement; and 4) the equilibrium payoffs of the parties. We can then determine whether P 1 will choose to employ confidential settlements if they are permitted, and assess the distributional impact of this choice.
For any probability of a second suit, (, let the marginal type accepting a settlement in the first suit, B*((), be defined implicitly by: is ordered by these three cases. Due to the incremental reduction in the likelihood of a future suit provided by settlement and by confidentiality, the benefit to the defendant from settling at a given demand is higher for a confidential settlement than an open one, which is higher than the benefit from settling if there were no P 2 (since, in that event, there is no benefit from reducing publicity).
Alternatively put, to induce the same marginal defendant type to settle, P 1 could demand more if the settlement is confidential rather than open, and more if the settlement is open than if there were no P 2 .
Thus, P 1 would lose more by triggering this marginal type to choose trial instead of settlement when settlement is confidential rather than open, and would lose more when settlement is open than if there were no P 2 . Hence, it is optimal for P 1 to induce more settlement when settlement is confidential rather than open, and more settlement when settlement is open than if there were no P 2 . G]. This observation and the fact that B C * < B O * implies that P 2 has less information after a confidential settlement than after an open settlement and that the set of D-types against which P 2 will go to trial is strictly greater because of confidentiality. This yields Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Confidentiality increases the likelihood of settlement in the early case, and decreases the likelihood of settlement (given suit) in the later case.
Total expected trial costs depend not only on the likelihood of settlement, but also on the fact that some later suits are suppressed by settlement and, a fortiori, by confidentiality. Total expected trial costs (as measured from our reference point, after P 1 has realized D's involvement) are given by k{F(B*(()) + ([F(B 2 *) -F(B*(())]}, where F(B*(()) is the likelihood of trial (given suit) in the early case, ( is the probability of a later suit and [F(B 2 *) -F(B*(())] is the likelihood of trial (given suit) in the later case. Note that total expected trial costs can also be written as k{(1 -()F(B*(()) + (F(B 2 *)}. Intuitively, since there are two possible lawsuits, this cost should be less than 2k, the court costs associated with the two suits. In fact, it appears to be considerably less: since the term in brackets is simply a convex combination of two fractions, total expected trial costs are a fraction of the cost of a single trial (that is, less than one k).
Since this expression is an increasing function of (, it follows that total expected trial costs are lower in configuration {TC} than in configuration {TO}. Equivalently, the expected number of trials is lower (overall) in configuration {TC} as compared with configuration {TO}. Proposition 4. Confidentiality reduces total expected trial costs.
Another comparison can be made with respect to settlement demands and expected settlements. Notice that the equilibrium settlement demand made by P 1 is not necessarily higher in configuration {TC} than in configuration {TO}. Since S*(() / (2 -()[B*(()* + k D ], then:
The first term on the right-hand-side is negative while the second term is positive, and although dB*(()/d( > 0, it is not possible to provide a precise relationship between B C * -B O * and ( O * -( C *.
If F(C) is the uniform distribution, one can compute S C * and S O * and show that S C * > S O *; however, we cannot prove that this holds for all admissible F. On the other hand, P 1 's expected settlement, S*(()[1 -F(B*(())], is a decreasing function of (, yielding the following result.
Proposition 5. Confidentiality results in a higher expected settlement for P 1 .
We now compare the equilibrium payoffs of the parties in configurations {TC} and {TO}. If confidential settlements are allowed, then P 1 will choose between the two configurations. P 1 will choose configuration {TC} when both {TC} and {TO} are available if and only if U 1 *(( C ) $ U 1 *(( O ). P 1 's payoff as parametrized by ( is given by:
where A / [B,B*(()]. Differentiating (and employing the envelope theorem) yields dU 1 *(()/d( < 0. That is, P 1 strictly prefers the configuration with the lower value of (, which is the one involving confidential settlements. Thus, when confidential settlement is permitted, the equilibrium for the overall game will involve the configuration {TC}. If confidentiality is prohibited, the equilibrium for the overall game will involve the configuration {TO}.
It is not surprising that P 2 's preferences are just the reverse of P 1 's. Let P 2 's equilibrium payoff for the overall game be denoted: G] now settle confidentially (rather than open) with P 1 , thereby reducing the probability of P 2 's suit from ( O to ( C . Since B is private information, P 1 cannot fully extract these benefits through her settlement demand. Thus, the class of defendants (or the average defendant) strictly prefers having the option to seal settlements.
Finally, the average plaintiff strictly prefers {TO} to {TC}. To see this, let U P *(() / U 1 *(() + U 2 *(() denote the sum of plaintiff payoffs (dividing by 2 yields the average payoff). It can be shown (see Claim 3 in Appendix B) that dU P *(()/d( > 0. Thus, as a class, plaintiffs strictly prefer the configuration {TO}. While the early plaintiff gains from having the option to seal a settlement, she gains less than the later plaintiff loses.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. P 1 strictly prefers {TC} to {TO}; P 2 strictly prefers {TO} to {TC}; the average D strictly prefers {TC} to {TO}; the average plaintiff strictly prefers {TO} to {TC}.
However, since the choice is P 1 's, the equilibrium configuration is {TC}.
Normative Implications
Our first welfare result follows directly from Proposition 6: there is no policy upon which P 1 , P 2 and D could agree ex post of the plaintiffs learning their identities (e.g., early vs. later). Moreover, when the parties do not know their identities but they do know their roles as plaintiff and defendant (we refer to choices made in these circumstances as role-interim choices), there is no role-interim policy on which they can agree, because the average plaintiff and the average defendant disagree about the desirability of allowing confidentiality.
If there were no significant role-interim decisions which affected welfare (beyond those involved in the negotiation process itself), then minimizing expected trial costs would maximize welfare in an ex ante sense, before agents know their roles as plaintiff and defendant. To see this, note that total welfare (as counted forward from the negotiation stage) is the expected gain to plaintiffs minus the expected loss to defendants. Since settlements and awards are simply transfers among the parties, total welfare reduces to (minus) total expected expenditures on trials. According to Proposition 4, total expected trial costs are lower when settlements are confidential.
However, a more comprehensive analysis of welfare would incorporate decisions made before harm occurs, but at the role-interim stage, where anticipated liability costs feed back into care decisions made by the potential defendant, while the anticipated level of compensation in the event of harm feeds back into defensive investment decisions made by potential plaintiffs. For example, if we consider a products liability context, then consumers will be plaintiffs and producers will be defendants, not vice versa. In this context, allowing confidentiality lowers the producer's anticipated liability costs and, therefore, his incentives to invest in improving product safety. Moreover, the availability of confidentiality as a bargaining option will reduce consumer willingness-to-pay for products, both because they anticipate that producers will take less care and because they expect less compensation in the event of harm when confidentiality is an option (since the average plaintiff prefers {TO} over {TC}). Reduced demand means lower profits and therefore, potentially, yet even lower R&D for safety improvements and product innovation.
In the Conoco case discussed earlier, confidentiality reduces the firm's incentive to invest in activities which improve containment, while residents who might otherwise live nearby will instead live further from the potential contamination source (at a higher cost or lower utility, an example of 13 While a few states have passed laws prohibiting sealed settlements, most (and the Federal government) provide for judicial discretion in these matters. defensive expenditures). Both of these effects are likely to be welfare-reducing if there is reason to expect that firms are currently providing too little care. Of course, if the potential defendant would otherwise take too much care or the potential plaintiff would otherwise invest too little in defensive expenditures, then confidentiality could improve welfare by reducing care and/or increasing defensive expenditures.
Thus, once these role-interim decisions are incorporated into the model, an ex ante welfare analysis of confidential settlements may result in a reversal (or reinforcement) of the tentative welfare result implied by Proposition 6. Moreover, different policies with respect to confidentiality will be optimal for different situations. The greater the impact that an extra dollar spent by defendants on care (or an extra dollar spent by potential plaintiffs on defensive activity) has on expected harm, the lower the social value of allowing confidential settlement. Does this mean that confidential settlements should be permitted or prohibited? As should be clear from the foregoing, unless there are no role-interim decisions that significantly impact welfare, no simple ex ante optimal policy can be formulated. This rationalizes why current policy is to employ judicial discretion 13 as a means for permitting or prohibiting sealing.
This requires courts to make a fairly complex assessment. Our analysis contributes to helping this assessment by highlighting a key factor that should be addressed by the court: the extent to which culpability is likely to be strongly correlated. To see this, we briefly outline the results of a model of weakly correlated culpability (a simplified version of the model in Daughety and Reinganum, 1999 case is an independent draw from a possibly different distribution, but the cases are still related because they involve the same defendant); the only impact comes through the publicity effect ( m (m = T, O or C). In this case, a suitably modified version of the model analyzed earlier shows that: 1) as with the strongly correlated case, P 1 and D strictly prefer {TC}while P 2 strictly prefers {TO} and 2) in contrast with the strongly correlated case, the average plaintiff P in the weakly correlated case strictly prefers {TC} if the expected difference in payoffs to P 2 and D (in the later suit) are sufficiently small (that is, if screening costs in the later suit are low; roughly, low screening costs occur if k is small or if the likelihood of settlement in the later case is high). The average plaintiff can benefit from confidentiality in the weakly correlated case because the value to D of suppressing a future suit is common knowledge to P 1 and D; P 1 can extract this full value in her settlement demand, a feat which she cannot accomplish as effectively in the case of strongly correlated culpability.
Thus, in the case of weakly correlated culpability with low screening costs, both the average plaintiff and D agree that confidentiality is desirable. Note that, in contrast with the analysis of strongly correlated culpability, consumers in this case have no incentive to increase their defensive expenditures (clearly, firms still have incentives to reduce care). This suggests that judges should lean toward allowing confidential settlements when culpability is weakly correlated, while seeking to verify that the anticipated savings in total expected trial costs are likely to outweigh any costs due to reduced provision of care.
The reverse recommendation seems appropriate for the strongly correlated case: here, while P 1 and D favor confidentiality, the average plaintiff does not. Increased consumer defensive expenditures (or demand reduction) as well as decreased care must be considered as possible costs when compared with the savings in expected trial costs that confidentiality generates. This suggests requiring proponents of a confidential settlement (that is, requiring both P 1 and D) to demonstrate that the net effect of allowing confidentiality is positive: the court should lean toward prohibiting confidential settlements when it suspects that there may be a sequence of cases in which culpability is strongly correlated.
Potential Extensions
A variety of generalizations are possible and desirable. We have allowed for a learning effect that might affect P 2 's behavior following a settlement; in equilibrium, however, learning affects P 2 's beliefs and payoffs but not her subsequent demand. This is a consequence of two things: 1) our assumption that culpability is the same in both cases (that is, following footnote 8, B 1 = B 2 = B) , so that Bayesian updating consists simply of re-normalizing the original distribution to the new interval [t z *, B G], in which case the hazard rate is independent of the belief t z *; and 2) the equilibrium marginal type for the early suit (B z *) is less than B 2 * and therefore the equilibrium marginal type for the later suit is not on the boundary of the set of types of interest ([t z *, B G]) and thus it remains B 2 *. If our assumption of strongly correlated culpability were relaxed (providing a conditional distribution,
, which is common knowledge to all players and satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio principle), then the hazard function for P 2 would now depend upon t z *. Thus, the disposition of the first case would influence P 2 's equilibrium demand through these beliefs. Since it is the more culpable of the defendant types who settle in the first case, it is reasonable to speculate that settlement would lead to beliefs that support a higher demand in the second case. If the same equilibrium pattern prevails in the first case (wherein a greater range of types settles confidentially than open), then a confidential settlement would also reduce P 2 's equilibrium demand (and D's expected costs in the second suit), as compared with an open settlement. We view a careful and complete analysis with a parametrized level of correlation as a substantial extension of the current model, but we expect the results would simply lie between those of the strongly and weakly correlated cases discussed earlier.
Another extension is suggested by the fact that P 2 's beliefs would not be updated if she were to learn S C * in an unanticipated way (since she can compute S C * in equilibrium). To incorporate an element of surprise, one could suppose, instead, that (prior to settlement) P 1 also obtains a private signal x that is affiliated (positively correlated) with B, allowing her to update her beliefs to F(B; x).
This might be due to costly discovery undertaken by P 1 . Then the settlement values S C * and S O * would reflect the value of x as well. Since S O * is observable, any information about x contained in it would be available to P 2 , but information in S C * about x would not be available to P 2 . In this case, learning the actual value of S C * (ex post, in an unanticipated way) would also affect P 2 's demand (increasing it, if x and B are affiliated random variables), to D's detriment.
A further avenue for generalization would be to allow P 1 to offer a menu of settlement demands, one associated with an open settlement and the other associated with a confidential settlement. Such a menu is used in Daughety and Reinganum (1999) , but in that model P 2 's beliefs about D's culpability in P 2 's case are not dependent upon the outcome of P 1 's case. This is because the defendant's culpability is weakly correlated (as described earlier) and thus there is no inference problem for P 2 . Extending the current paper to allow for a menu of offers means that the continuation game upon P 2 observing a particular type of settlement is very complex: for instance, upon observing an open settlement at S O , P 2 must form a conjecture about whether a confidential settlement offer was rather than go to trial). We leave the complete characterization of equilibrium in this more general model for future research, but we are able to rule out certain configurations which one might think are very plausible, in particular, {TOC}, as well as others that seem less plausible, such as {OC}, {TCO} and {CO} (see Claim 4 in Appendix B).
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we present a model wherein a plaintiff and a defendant can negotiate a confidential settlement. The private purpose of confidentiality is to disenfranchise a later plaintiff by keeping the existence and details of the instant agreement secret, thereby reducing the likelihood that the defendant faces a later suit or, if such a suit occurs, reducing the information about the defendant's culpability that is available to a second plaintiff. Such confidential settlements appear to be fairly common (though, obviously, no statistics are readily available) and have been the source of considerable policy debate of late. The outlines of the debate are fairly clear: arguments that secrecy inhibits the flow of information and inequitably denies compensation to deserving plaintiffs battle arguments that secrecy protects privacy and encourages settlement, which reduces court costs and congestion.
We addressed this issue in the context of strongly correlated culpability on the part of a defendant facing a possible sequence of lawsuits. The analysis incorporates two aspects of information flow. First, a publicity effect, whereby suits by later plaintiffs are encouraged by the publicity surrounding the disposition of earlier suits. Second, the correlation of the defendant's culpability means that later plaintiffs can benefit from information about culpability released by the disposition of the earlier suits; this was a learning effect. While P 2 learns B directly in the case of trial, how much P 2 can infer about B from a settlement depends upon the actual settlement demand if open, or simply the fact of a settlement if confidential. For instance, if P 1 were to make a very high open settlement demand, and D were to accept it, then P 2 would infer that D was highly culpable (e.g., B > B 2 *), and this would be reflected in P 2 's demand. However, in equilibrium, P 1 chooses not to make such informative demands, since they entail a high likelihood of trial for P 1 . Thus, while the model allows for learning, and P 2 does update her beliefs about B on the basis of the outcome of P 1 's suit, what P 2 learns from a settlement is not reflected in P 2 's demand (or D's costs of the second suit) in equilibrium.
Part of what P 1 provides to D is the suppression of information that might be useful to P 2 : highly culpable Ds benefit from obfuscation, since P 1 also settles confidentially with moderately culpable Ds.
We found that an early plaintiff chooses to make settlements confidential, if given the option.
While confidentiality decreases the likelihood of trial (given suit) in the early case and increases this likelihood in the later case, it reduces total expected trial costs. Confidentiality also increases the expected settlement obtained by the early plaintiff, yet leaves the average defendant better off as well.
We further found that, even though early plaintiffs would prefer confidentiality and later plaintiffs would favor prohibiting confidentiality, the average plaintiff favors prohibition. This is despite the fact that our screening analysis "stacks the deck" in favor of plaintiffs (since it allocates them maximal bargaining power). We also showed that the average defendant prefers confidentiality.
When role-interim decisions have no (or small) adverse welfare consequences, society would ex ante favor permitting confidential settlements. In general, however, we argued that there are important role-interim effects that may make allowing confidential settlements inadvisable. In particular, if agents know their roles, then this conflict of preferences can mean increased defensive expenditures on the part of potential plaintiffs and reduced care on the part of potential defendants.
There is no simple ex ante optimal rule as to whether sealing should be prohibited or permitted in all possible transactions. We did discuss, however, how the preceding analysis of strongly correlated culpability (in conjunction with a modified analysis that involved weakly correlated culpability) suggests that when role-interim actions can be expected to influence the welfare computation, judicial review can key on the likely presence or absence of correlated culpability to decide where the burden of showing that confidentiality would be welfare-reducing or -enhancing should be placed. From society's viewpoint, silence can be golden or leaden depending upon the impact of confidentiality on the potential transactions in the markets that rely upon the legal process as a means for compensating harm and encouraging care. Judicial review, with a shifting burden of proof depending upon the extent of correlation of a defendant's culpability across real or potential plaintiffs, allows a tailored policy regarding confidential settlement agreements.
APPENDIX A
In this Appendix, we complete the derivation of the equilibrium strategies for P 1 , D and P 2 , for the configurations {TO} and {TC}.
Configuration {TO}
Upon observing an open settlement with P 1 in the amount S O , P 2 believes that B 0
However, independent of P 2 's beliefs, P 2 will never demand less than B 2 ** + k D (recall that P 2 's optimal demand is s* 
Configuration {TC}
In this configuration, P 2 observes only the fact, not the amount, of a settlement. Thus, P 2 's beliefs are simply a number, t C , rather than a function. Again, recall that P 2 's optimal demand is s*(C) = max{B 2 *,t C }* + k D and D accepts if B $ max{B 2 *,t C } and otherwise rejects. Since P 2 's demand and D's acceptance policy are the same for all t C # B 2 *, it suffices to define P 1 's payoff for beliefs t C $ B 2 * (P 1 's payoff for beliefs t C # B 2 * are exactly the same as P 1 's payoff for beliefs t C = B 2 *). Thus, following a confidential settlement with P 1 , a defendant of type B # B 2 * expects to pay B* + k D in a second suit. Therefore, the highest demand on the part of P 1 that is acceptable to a type B # B 2 *, G]. Since P 1 's overall payoff involves a transition from one to the other at B C = t C , this introduces the possibility that P 1 's overall payoff is not singlepeaked in B C , though it is continuous at B C = t C since S C (t C ) = Ŝ C (t C ; t C ).
This gives rise to two possible candidates for an equilibrium. In one candidate for an equilibrium, P 1 makes a relatively low demand and settles with a relatively large fraction of defendant types. In the other candidate for an equilibrium, P 1 makes a relatively high demand and settles with a relatively low fraction of (highly culpable) defendant types. In the remainder of this Appendix, we derive the first candidate and verify that it is an equilibrium, under the parameter restriction given in the text (Assumption 3). In Appendix B (available from the authors upon request), we verify that the other candidate is never an equilibrium (in particular, if P 2 expects the second type of candidate for an equilibrium, P 1 would do better by defecting to the first type of candidate).
One possible candidate for an equilibrium involves P 1 choosing a marginal type B C , such that B C # t C . To obtain this candidate, we maximize ũ 1 (B C ; S C (B C )), yielding It is clear that B C * so-defined is less thanB G and Assumption 2' ensures that B C * > B. Finally, since: 1) */k > (2 -( C )*/{k + (1 -( C )[B C ** + k D ]} by Assumption 1; 2) h(C) is increasing by Assumption 2; and 3) B 2 * is defined by h(B 2 *) = */k, it follows that B C * < B 2 *.
Thus, there is a unique candidate for an equilibrium with B C # t C . In it, P 1 demands S C * = (2 -( C )[B C ** + k D ], which is accepted by all defendant types with B $ B C * and rejected by all defendant types with B < B C *. Upon observing a trial, P 2 observes B and demands B* + k D , which is accepted by the defendant. Upon observing a confidential settlement, P 2 believes that this demand would have been accepted by all defendants with B $ t C = B C *. Since B C * < B 2 *, P 2 demands s*(C) = B 2 ** + k D ; defendants with B < B 2 * go to trial while those with B $ B 2 * settle with P 2 .
To verify that this candidate actually is an equilibrium, we must show that if P 2 believes t C = B C *, then it will be optimal for P 1 to choose B C *; that is, B C * maximizes u 1 (B C ; B C *) on [B, B G]. First, recall that u 1 (B C ; B C *) = u 1 (B C ; B 2 *) for all B C . Thus, B C * maximizes u 1 (B C ; B C *) if and only if it also maximizes u 1 (B C ; B 2 *). The preceding analysis implies that B C * maximizes ũ 1 (B C ; S C (B C )) for B C 0 [B, B 2 *]. What remains to be shown is that P 1 would not want to defect to any B C > B 2 *. To see that this is true, we differentiate û 1 (B C ; Ŝ C (B C ; B 2 *)) with respect to B C and evaluate it at B C = B 2 *. Differentiating yields: 
Since f(B 2 *)/[1 -F(B 2 *)] = */k, the expression above is non-positive under Assumption 3. Since the function û 1 (B C ; Ŝ C (B C ; B 2 *)) is single-peaked and its derivative at B C = B 2 * is non-positive, no B C > B 2 * can provide a higher payoff than û 1 (B 2 *; Ŝ C (B 2 *; B 2 *)) = ũ 1 (B 2 *; S C (B 2 *)) < ũ 1 (B C *; S C (B C *)) = u 1 (B C *; B 2 *) = u 1 (B C *; B C *). Thus, B C * maximizes u 1 (B C ; B C *) on [B, B G]. QED APPENDIX B (for the referees; to be provided on the Web or by request from the authors)
A second possible candidate for an equilibrium involves B C $ t C (where recall that t C $ B 2 *; since any t C < B 2 * is payoff-equivalent to t C = B 2 * for P 1 ). To obtain this candidate, we maximize û 1 (B C ; Ŝ C (B C ; t C )), yielding
and Ŝ C N(B C ; t C ) = 2*, and re-arranging implies that an interior optimum (if one exists) is defined implicitly by:
This equation implicitly describes P 1 's best response B C to P 2 's belief t C ; to be an equilibrium, the marginal type, denoted B C , must be a best response to itself. Thus, a second candidate for an equilibrium is defined implicitly by
Again, it is clear that B C so-defined is less thanB G and Assumption 2' ensures that B C > B. If we relax Assumption 3, then this candidate (B C ) for an equilibrium will exist. However, it can be shown that (if P 2 expects the marginal defendant type in the first stage to be B C ), then P 1 would do better by defecting to the marginal type B C *. Thus, there can never be a pure strategy equilibrium involving B C .
To see this, notice that in the candidate for an equilibrium involving B C , P 1 demands Ŝ C = (2 -( C )[B C * + k D ], which is accepted by all defendant types with B $ B C and rejected by all defendant types with B < B C . This results in a payoff for P 1 of û 1 (B C ; Ŝ C (B C ; B C )). On the other hand, if P 1 were to demand S C * rather than Ŝ C , then all types B 0 [B C *, B G] would accept S C * rather than go to trial (given that P 2 's beliefs and behavior are unchanged by this unobservable defection, accepting S C * and continuing as before with P 2 results in lower payments for all D types B 0 (B C *, B G]). This would result in P 1 receiving the payoff ũ 1 (B C *; S C (B C *)) > ũ 1 (B C ; S C (B C )) = û 1 (B C ; Ŝ C (B C ; B C )), where the inequality follows since B C * maximizes ũ 1 (B C ; S C (B C )) and the equality follows from the continuity of u 1 (B C ; t C ) at the point B C = t C . Thus, there can never be an equilibrium involving B C . QED The same argument works for the configuration {OC} since we can simply set B TO = B in the proof above. Straightforward modifications also cover the cases of {TCO} and {CO}. In the case of {TCO}, there will be marginal types B TC and B CO . P 2 's demands will be s'(C) < B CO * + k D and s'(O) = max{B CO ,B 2 }* + k D . The marginal type B CO is indifferent between accepting P 1 's open settlement demand (and then either being pooled by P 2 at the demand B CO * + k D or being asked to pay B 2 * + k D and choosing trial instead) and P 1 's confidential settlement demand: S O ' + ( O [B CO * + k D ] = S C ' + ( C s'(C). In order for {TCO} to be an equilibrium, the defendant type B CO -, must (at least weakly) prefer to accept P 1 's confidential settlement demand. Accepting P 1 's confidential settlement demand yields the same payoff S C ' + ( C s'(C). However, accepting P 1 's open settlement demand yields the payoff S O ' + ( O [B CO * -,* + k D ], since P 2 demands more than this defendant type is willing to pay to settle, resulting in a trial. Comparing these two payoffs indicates that a defendant of type B CO -, strictly prefers to accept P 1 's open settlement demand, which is a contradiction. QED
Claims

